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Corporate tax systems in the developed countries have undergone dramatic
changes over the past decades as statutory tax rates have fallen and tax
bases have only gradually widened. We argue that these changes are largely
consistent with tougher competition speciﬁcally for foreign direct investment
(FDI). We make our case in three steps. First, we develop a model in which
countries set both corporate tax rates and bases to compete for FDI. This
model generates testable predictions concerning the slope of policy reaction
functions with regard to the tax rate and the tax base, and links changes
in equilibrium tax rates and bases to observable industry and country char-
acteristics. Second, we use data on corporate tax systems in 43 countries
(OECD members plus a number of emerging markets) to test the model’s
predictions. Third, we apply the estimated model to assess what role re-
gional integration has played in the increase in tax competition and to what
extent it is responsible for the observed changes in the tax system.
Median statutory tax rates in our sample of industrialized countries and
emerging markets have drastically declined to less than 30% in 2005 from
around 50% in the early 1980s. At the same time, the median tax base has
become somewhat broader, as reﬂected in a gradual decrease in depreciation
allowances. The overall eﬀect, as conﬁrmed by Devereux et al. (2002) for
OECD countries, has been a reduction in the eﬀective average tax rate since
the early 1980s, while the eﬀective marginal tax rate has remained more or
less stable. This downward trend in the eﬀective average tax rate is consistent
with more intense competition for mobile multinational enterprises, since
the proﬁtability of a plant location depends on the average rather than the
marginal rate. Tougher tax competition for portfolio capital, by contrast,
would have suggested a fall in the eﬀective marginal tax rate (see Devereux
et al., 2002).
To develop stylized facts about the strategic interactions, if any, that take
place when countries set tax policy it is useful to take a look at the uncondi-
tional correlations in domestic and foreign tax instruments reported in Table
11.1 Foreign and domestic tax rates are positively correlated, as are foreign
and domestic depreciation allowances. However, foreign (domestic) tax rates
and domestic (foreign) depreciation allowances are negatively correlated. A
lower foreign tax rate is thus associated with a lower domestic tax rate but a
higher domestic depreciation allowance. This suggests that countries might
react to a fall in their competitors’ tax rates by cutting their own tax rates
and narrowing their tax base. Needless to say, this reaction pattern at the
micro level is obscured by the aggregate ﬁgures which show a drop in the
median tax rate but a slight widening of the median tax base over the years.
The current paper oﬀers a simple explanation for the observed reaction
pattern based on competition for discrete investment projects by multina-
tional enterprises. Speciﬁcally we posit a world in which governments have
to deal with two basic issues. First, due to market power, domestic ﬁrms and
multinationals underinvest and thus produce too little output from the point
of view of social welfare. Second, proﬁts of multinationals not captured by
source-based taxation may be repatriated to foreign owners. In response to
these issues, a welfare-maximizing government will implicitly subsidize cap-
ital through a low eﬀective marginal tax rate and capture a share of the
multinationals’ proﬁts by making its eﬀective average tax rate as high as
possible without deterring the investment projects. When a rival government
reduces its tax rate or grants a more generous depreciation allowance, the
best response is to reduce the eﬀective average tax rate while keeping the
eﬀective marginal tax rate constant. This can be achieved by lowering the
corporate tax rate while increasing the depreciation allowance. Our model
1See Section 5.4 for further details. Foreign tax instruments are computed as the
weighted average of instruments for each country’s competitors. Weights are based on po-
tential (predicted) bilateral commodity trade ﬂows. All regressions include country ﬁxed
eﬀects but no other covariates. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation. Correlations should not be interpreted as reaction function parameters, since
the lack of fundamentals leads to inconsistent Nash tax rates.
2thus generates the observed negative correlation between changes in tax rates
and depreciation allowances in response to shocks in the degree of compet-
ition for FDI. Our empirical analysis shows that this best-response pattern
of countries is conﬁrmed by the data.
By simultaneously considering changes in tax rates and depreciation al-
lowances our paper reﬁnes the classical literature on tax competition, in which
tax rates are the only policy instrument (see Wilson, 1999, and Wilson and
Wildasin, 2004, for surveys of the literature). Another deviation from this
literature is the focus on competition for discrete investment projects, which
seems appropriate given the observed fall in eﬀective average tax rates and
stability of eﬀective marginal tax rates. Closely related papers are by Hauﬂer
and Schjelderup (2000) as well as Devereux et al. (2008), which also feature
governments that compete for FDI using tax rates and depreciation allow-
ances.2 These two papers oﬀer an explanation for the change in corporate
tax systems that is complementary to ours. They argue that countries are
forced to reduce corporate tax rates in response to attempts by multinational
enterprises to use transfer pricing to shift proﬁts to the lowest-tax location.
Countries simultaneously reduce depreciation allowances either because they
face a ﬁxed tax revenue requirement and need to make up for the loss of
revenue stemming from the lower tax rate (Hauﬂer and Schjelderup, 2000),
or because they are large and want to strategically depress the world price
of capital (Devereux et al., 2008). Both papers have in common that changes
in tax rates and depreciation allowances are positively correlated, which is in
contradiction to the stylized facts presented in Table 1 above.
In our theoretical model, the degree of tax competition depends, among
other things, on the degree of regional integration. Regional integration, by
reducing trade costs between countries, induces tougher competition in cor-
2See also Becker and Fuest (2009), and Osmundsen et al. (1998). In these two papers,
governments set tax rates and depreciation allowances to discriminate between ﬁrms with
diﬀerent productivity, resp. mobility costs. Janeba (1996) considers the use of tax rates
and depreciation allowances to shift proﬁts between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Bauer et
al. (2011) examine the eﬀect of economic integration on tax rates and bases in a theoretical
model with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
3porate tax rates and depreciation allowances. We investigate whether the
observed changes in tax policy are consistent with regional integration by
using our empirical model to construct several counterfactual scenarios in
which regional integration agreements in Europe and North America are ab-
sent. Our simulations show that without the regional trade agreements tax
rates would indeed have been signiﬁcantly higher and depreciation allow-
ances a bit smaller, suggesting that regional integration may be one of the
underlying reasons for the observed policy changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of tax rate and tax base competition for FDI to demonstrate the
workings of our tax competition mechanism and derive testable predictions
concerning the slope of reaction functions and comparative static eﬀects. In
Section 3 we characterize the Nash equilibrium taxes and depreciation allow-
ances. Section 4 derives comparative static results, and Section 5 contains the
empirical analysis. In Section 6 we use the empirical model to simulate the
eﬀects on tax policy of regional integration agreements. Section 7 concludes.
The Appendix contains proofs and data sources.
2 The Model
We consider a region consisting of two countries, labeled home (H) and for-
eign (F). Multinational ﬁrms, owned by residents in the rest of the world,
are mobile between the two countries, whereas households and national ﬁrms
stay put. In order to focus on discrete location decisions of multinationals, we
assume that capital markets–capital being the only factor of production–
are perfectly integrated across the world, but product markets are segmented
by trade barriers.3
3Our theoretical model builds on papers by Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999), Raﬀ (2004),
and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006); but these papers consider only tax rate competition for
FDI. A related paper examining competition in two policy instruments, in this case taxes
and performance requirements, is by Davies and Ellis (2007).
42.1 Households
We assume that H has a measure n ≥ 1 of households, whereas the meas-
ure of households in F is normalized to one. Households in H and F have
identical preferences. Each household residing in country j = H,F consumes
a numeraire good yj and a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods qj(i), i ∈ Ωj,
where Ωj is the set of diﬀerentiated goods available in j. The utility function
of a household residing in j is given by











The numeraire goods is competitively provided in each country, whereas
the diﬀerentiated goods are produced under imperfect competition. Produc-
tion of a unit of the numeraire good requires exactly one unit of capital.
Hence the price of capital is equal to one in both countries. The numeraire
good can be transported freely across countries, so trade is always balanced.
Each household in country j = H,F inelastically supplies one unit of
capital each. The household also receives proﬁt income, πj, from the domestic
ﬁrms it owns and tax revenue Rj, which is redistributed by the government in
lump-sum fashion. Denoting the consumer prices of the diﬀerentiated goods




pj(i)qj(i)di = 1 + πj + Rj. (2)
Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint yields the household’s
demand curves
qj(i) = 1 − pj(i). (3)
Denoting total sales in country j by Qj(i) we can write inverse market de-
mand in the two countries as
pH(i) = 1 −
QH(i)
n
and pF(i) = 1 − QF(i). (4)
Markets in the two countries are segmented so that ﬁrms can set prices
independently in each market.
52.2 Firms
Each ﬁrm specializes in a single industry i, so that each diﬀerentiated good is
produced by a monopolist. We distinguish between two types of ﬁrms, mul-
tinationals and domestic ﬁrms, and assume that a positive fraction of ﬁrms is
multinational. Multinationals are owned by residents in the rest of the world
and seek to locate a production plant in either H or F from which to supply
the whole region.4 Domestic ﬁrms in H and F are owned by local residents
and immobile across countries; each domestic ﬁrm has a plant in its native
country from which it may also export to the other country. Otherwise do-
mestic ﬁrms are identical to multinationals. In particular, each ﬁrm requires
c < 1 units of capital per unit of output, so that c can be interpreted as
the marginal cost of production. The per-unit trade cost between countries,
denoted by s, is suﬃciently small to guarantee positive exports for each ﬁrm,
i.e., s < 1 − c. In the remainder of the paper we drop industry identiﬁers
whenever possible.
2.3 Governments
The governments of H and F choose tax policy to maximize the utility of the
households under their jurisdiction, or social welfare for short. Social welfare
consists of the sum of tax revenue and consumer surplus. Each government
has two policy instruments: a source-based corporation tax on proﬁts, τ,
and a depreciation allowance, δ, that determines the tax base; F’s policy
instruments are identiﬁed by an asterisk (∗).5 Hence the tax paid by a (mul-
tinational or domestic) ﬁrm located in country H and selling its output in








QH + (1 − QF − δc − s)QF
￿
,
4It is implicitly assumed that there is a suﬃciently large set-up cost for a plant (re-
lative to the cost of transporting goods between H and F) so that it does not pay the
multinational to have a plant in each country.
5We implicitly assume that the multinationals’ tax payments in H and F are exempt
from further taxation in their home countries. We revisit this assumption in the empirical
part of the paper.
6and the corresponding after-tax proﬁt is equal to






QH + (1 − QF − s)QF − c(QH + QF)
￿
(5)
−(1 − δ)τc(QH + QF).
It turns out to be convenient to rewrite this function in terms of the eﬀective
marginal tax rate (EMTR) on capital, α − 1, which we deﬁne as follows:







After a simple transformation we hence obtain






QH + (1 − QF − s)QF − αc(QH + QF)
￿
. (7)
The corporation tax is hence equivalent to a pure proﬁt tax, if δ = 1 and
therefore α = 1. If δ > 1 (α < 1), more than the true capital cost can
be deducted for tax purposes; hence capital use in production is implicitly
subsidized (EMTR < 0). If δ < 1 (α > 1), the taxable cost is less than the
actual cost, and the capital input is implicitly taxed (EMTR > 0). In the
following we will work with α instead of δ. However, given the statutory tax
rate and the EMTR we can easily compute δ.
The reason why the governments will want to use two instruments to tax
ﬁrms is that there are two “distortions”: (i) as monopolists ﬁrms produce
too little output, giving the government an incentive to subsidize production;
and (ii) multinationals, being owned by foreign residents, will repatriate their
proﬁts unless the government captures them with a tax.
Governments are assumed to be able to commit to the policies they an-
nounce. For instance, if country j oﬀers a low corporate tax rate to attract
multinationals, it does not rescind its oﬀer once the ﬁrms have made their
investment.6
6The commitment problem and its eﬀect on FDI has been extensively discussed in
the literature (see, for instance, Bond and Samuelson, 1988, and Doyle and van Wijnber-
gen, 1994). The current paper has nothing new to add to this literature. We avoid the
commitment problem by abstracting from sunk investment costs.
72.4 Timing
The strategic interaction between the governments and the ﬁrms can be
represented by a sequential game with the following order of moves:
Stage 1: H and F choose their policy instruments simultaneously and non-
cooperatively.
Stage 2: Firms observes these policies, and multinationals decide in which
country to locate.
Stage 3: Firms choose output.
In the next section we characterize the countries’ best response functions
and the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this game (equilibria for
short).
3 Equilibrium
Taxes collected from domestic ﬁrms simply ﬂow back to domestic residents,
the owners of the ﬁrms, through the redistribution of government tax revenue.
This implies that the optimal level of the proﬁt tax in the case of domestic
ﬁrms is indeterminate. Rather, proﬁt taxes are set to attract multinationals.
Speciﬁcally, governments have to take into account the participation con-
straints of multinationals.
Consider the participation constraint from the point of view of country
H (obviously, the same reasoning applies to country F). A multinational will
locate in H, if the associated proﬁt exceeds the proﬁt from locating in F.
Hence the participation constraint for a multinational in H is:
(1 − τ)
n(1 − αc)
2 + (1 − αc − s)
2
4
≥ (1 − τ
∗)
(1 − α∗c)




Since social welfare is strictly increasing in τ, H will want to make sure
that the multinational’s participation constraint is binding. A binding par-
ticipation constraint implies that the social welfare associated with a good
8produced by a domestic ﬁrm (consisting of the sum of consumer surplus and
proﬁt) exceeds the welfare generated by a multinational produced good by
exactly (1 − τ∗)
￿
(1 − α∗c)
2 + n(1 − α∗c − s)
2￿
/4, that is, by the part of the
proﬁt that cannot be captured by the corporate tax because the multinational
would otherwise locate in F. Since this amount depends only on F’s policy
parameters, the optimal level of α is the same for domestic and multinational
ﬁrms. Hence we can state the following result:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium H chooses α = ¯ α, and F sets α∗ = ¯ α∗, where
¯ α =








Note that ¯ α − 1 < 0 and ¯ α∗ − 1 < 0 so that the optimal EMTR is
negative. That is, the government implicitly subsidizes investment to reduce
the monopoly distortion and increase consumer surplus.7 More importantly,
the optimal level of α (α∗) depends only on marginal production costs and
country size. Hence a government optimally responds to a change in its rival’s
tax policies by keeping its EMTR unchanged and adjusting its corporate tax
rate to satisfy the multinationals’ participation constraints. This dramatically
simpliﬁes the characterization of the equilibrium policies.
Using α = ¯ α and α∗ = ¯ α∗ in (8) implicitly deﬁnes H’s best response
function in tax rates:
(1 − τ)
n(1 − ¯ αc)
2 + (1 − ¯ αc − s)
2
4
− (1 − τ
∗)
(1 − ¯ α∗c)




a similar function characterizes F’s best response. This best response function
has a positive slope, meaning that corporate tax rates are strategic comple-
ments. If country F lowers τ∗, so that the proﬁt multinationals may earn
7Consider the EMTR in H. Since part of the output is exported to F, the subsidy falls
short of the level needed to reduce the domestic price in H to marginal cost c. However,
it is easy to show that if the trade cost is prohibitive so that the entire subsidy falls on
local output, the optimal implicit subsidy, ¯ α = (2c − 1)/c, indeed induces marginal cost
pricing.
9when locating in F rises, H’s government is forced to cut its tax rate to keep
them from relocating.
To compute the equilibrium, note that given the rival’s corporate tax rate,
each country will try to lower its corporate tax rate just enough to attract the
multinationals. For s > 0 and n > 1, H has a locational advantage relative
to F, since with identical policies and positive trade costs multinationals
prefer to locate in the larger market. It is easily veriﬁed that in equilibrium
the government of F chooses the τ∗ that makes it just indiﬀerent between
attracting multinationals and having them locate in H. H’s government sets
τ so as to attract the multinationals and extract the locational rent.
That is, F’s government chooses τ∗ so that welfare (consisting of the sum
of consumer surplus and tax revenue) when a ﬁrm locates in F is just equal
to welfare (i.e., the consumer surplus from importing the good) when the
ﬁrm is located in H:




∗(1 − ¯ α∗c)




(1 − ¯ α∗)c((1 − ¯ α∗c) + n(1 − ¯ α∗c − s))
2
=




Substituting for ¯ α and ¯ α∗ from (9), this equation deﬁnes F’s equilibrium tax
as a function ¯ τ∗ = ¯ τ∗(c,n,s).
H’s government sets τ such that multinationals are indiﬀerent between
locating in H or in F. The equilibrium value of τ can be computed from (10)
by setting τ∗ = ¯ τ∗ and using the expressions for ¯ α and ¯ α∗. We denote the
equilibrium tax rate by ¯ τ = ¯ τ(c,n,s).
Given the equilibrium policies ¯ τ and ¯ α (¯ τ∗ and ¯ α∗) we can use (6) to solve
for the equilibrium depreciation allowance ¯ δ (¯ δ
∗). Totally diﬀerentiating (6)
we can derive how ¯ δ has to be adjusted following changes in ¯ τ so that α




1 − ¯ δ
¯ τ(1 − ¯ τ)
< 0, (12)
where it should be noted that, since ¯ α < 1, we have ¯ δ > 1 for ¯ τ > 0 and
¯ δ < 1 for ¯ τ < 0. Similarly for F we obtain d¯ δ
∗
d¯ τ∗ < 0. That is, an increase in the
10tax rate has to be accompanied by a reduction in the depreciation allowance
to hold the EMTR ﬁxed at the optimal level.
4 Comparative Statics
Next, we investigate the properties of the Nash equilibrium. It is straight-
forward to obtain analytical solutions for ¯ τ(c,n,s) and ¯ τ∗(c,n,s), and to
compute the partial derivatives of taxes and depreciation allowances with
respect to c, n and s. But the expressions are complicated. To derive pre-
cise results and develop intuition for the comparative static properties of the
Nash equilibrium we therefore evaluate the partial derivatives at s = 0 (free
trade); all proofs are in the Appendix.8
Consider how the equilibrium policies change with the trade cost. We can
prove:
Proposition 1 If s is suﬃciently small, a marginal increase in the trade
cost raises each country’s tax rate and decreases the depreciation allowance.
An increase in s makes country H a more attractive location for the
multinationals relative to F. This allows H to raise its tax rate for any given
value of its rival’s tax rate. In other words, H’s best response function, (10),
shifts outward. How F’s equilibrium tax rate changes with s can be derived
from (11). There are two opposing eﬀects. First, an increase in s raises the
consumer surplus when a multinational locates in F relative to when it locates
in H, which implies that F would ceteris paribus be willing to lower its tax
rate to attract the ﬁrm. Second, an increase in s lowers the proﬁt the ﬁrm
can earn when locating in F; hence attracting the ﬁrm is only advantageous
for F if it can levy a higher tax rate.
The second eﬀect dominates at s = 0 (and s > 0 if n is suﬃciently big)
so that both H’s and F’s equilibrium tax rates are increasing in s. Market
integration in the form of a marginal reduction in trade costs between the two
8We also ran simulations to verify that the signs of the partial derivatives are robust
for s > 0.
11countries thus leads to lower tax rates. As tax rates decrease, depreciation
allowances have to increase to keep the eﬀective marginal tax rate unchanged,
so as not to distort the output choices of ﬁrms.
Since a rise in the trade cost increases the attractiveness of country H
as a plant location relatively to country F, tax rates in H and F diverge as
H raises its tax rate by more than F (
∂(¯ τ−¯ τ∗)
∂s > 0). Depreciation allowances,




∂s < 0). This implies:
Proposition 2 If s is suﬃciently small, a marginal increase in the trade
cost leads to a divergence of tax rates and a convergence of depreciation al-
lowances.
Next, consider the comparative statics with respect to country size n. We
can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If s is suﬃciently small and n is suﬃciently big, an increase
in the size of country H relative to that of F, (i) raises the tax rate in H
and reduces the tax rate in F; and (ii) raises the depreciation allowance in
H, and reduces the depreciation allowance in F.
An increase in the size of country H relative to F increases the location
rent that H can extract from the multinational through its tax rate, and
worsens F’s competitive position. Ceteris paribus, this allows H to raise
its tax rate and forces F to reduce its tax rate. Changes in n also aﬀect









c(2n+1)2 > 0. Having a bigger market lowers H’s optimal EMTR,
and vice versa for F whose market shrinks. Changes in equilibrium tax rates
and depreciation allowances thus reﬂect both the changes in location rents
and the changes in the optimal EMTR.
Finally consider how the equilibrium policies react to changes in the mar-
ginal cost:
12Proposition 4 When s is suﬃciently small and n is suﬃciently big, or when
countries are symmetric (n = 1) and s and c are suﬃciently small, an in-
crease in the marginal cost weakly reduces tax rates and decreases the depre-
ciation allowance.




c2(n+2) > 0 and
∂(¯ α∗−1)
∂c = 1
c2(2n+1) > 0. An increase in c also reduces the




The theoretical model yields two sets of testable hypotheses: (i) ones concern-
ing the slope of policy reaction functions; and (ii) ones concerning the eﬀects
of changes in the exogenous variables on equilibrium policies. The hypotheses
concerning the strategic relationship between H’s and F’s policy variables
follow directly from the fact that tax rates are strategic complements, and
that in each country the depreciation allowance has to move in the oppos-
ite direction from the tax rate to keep the country’s EMTR at the optimal
level. Hence if a rival lowers its tax rate or raises its depreciation allowance,
thereby increasing the multinational’s proﬁt from locating there, the country
will react by lowering its own tax rate and raising its depreciation allowance.
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The tax rate is a strategic complement to the rival’s tax rate.
Hypothesis 2 The tax rate is a strategic substitute to the rival’s depreci-
ation allowance, and the depreciation allowance is a strategic substitute
to the rival’s tax rate.
Hypothesis 3 The depreciation allowance is a strategic complement to the
rival’s depreciation allowance.
13The hypotheses regarding the impact of exogenous variables on equi-
librium policies follow from Propositions 1 to 4. These propositions can be
straightforwardly translated into testable hypotheses with the caveat that we
cannot explicitly test the conditions under which the theoretical predictions
hold:
Hypothesis 4 A marginal increase in the trade cost raises the tax rate and
decreases the depreciation allowance.
Hypothesis 5 A marginal increase in the trade cost leads to a divergence
of tax rates and a convergence of depreciation allowances.
Hypothesis 6 An increase in country size raises the tax rate and the de-
preciation allowance.
Hypothesis 7 An increase in the marginal cost weakly reduces the tax rates
and decreases the depreciation allowance.
5.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The theoretical model suggests that governments may use two instruments
to compete for multinational plant location: statutory tax rates and depre-
ciation allowances. The empirical data-set allows inference from panel data.
Therefore, we use a time (year) index t = 1,...,T to refer to a cross-section of
countries in a speciﬁc period. Let us collect the determinants of the (Nash)
equilibrium in these two instruments for year t into the N × K matrix Xt,
where N denotes the number of countries in the sample. According to the
theoretical model, country size (n), production cost (c), and trade cost (s)
belong in Xt. We refer to the corresponding N × 1 vectors for all countries
in year t as nt, ct.and st, respectively. With panel data, we are able to con-
trol for an exhaustive set of time-invariant determinants by accounting for
ﬁxed country-speciﬁc eﬀects. With matrix notation, for year t this involves
an N × N identity matrix It. With these deﬁnitions at hand, we may deﬁne
Xt = [nt,ct,st,It] so that K = 3 + N. Note that the variables in Xt matter
14for the Nash equilibrium in both the N × 1 vector of statutory tax rates τt
and the vector of depreciation allowance parameters δt. However, the mar-
ginal eﬀects of these variables (hence, the corresponding parameters in the
econometric model) may diﬀer. Let us refer to the K ×1 vector of paramet-
ers on Xt in the equation for statutory tax rates as ξτ and to the one in the
equation for depreciation allowances as ξδ.
Most importantly, strategic interaction among governments leads to in-
terdependence in the setting of the two instruments according to the theoret-
ical model. The empirical modeling of the corresponding strategic interaction
faces two challenges: the domestic statutory tax rate (τt) is a function of the
foreign statutory tax rate (τ ∗
t) and the foreign depreciation allowance para-
meter (δ
∗




t. Of course, with a data-set of more than two countries,
for each economy τ∗
t and δ
∗
t reﬂect weighted averages of the tax parameters
of all other countries. Let us deﬁne an N × N weighting matrix W whose
elements correspond to weights.9
Two important properties of W are that it contains zero diagonal ele-
ments and that its row sums are bounded, e.g., due to normalizing entries by
their row-sum. Hence, domestic tax instruments are (strategically) related to
average foreign ones. For instance, for country i the corresponding weighted
average of foreign statutory tax rates in year t would be τit = wiτt, where wi
is a 1×N row vector of W whose elements sum up to unity. For all countries,
we may write τ ∗
t = Wτt. Similarly, we may write δ
∗
t = Wδt.
9We use three alternative weighting schemes in our analysis. One is based on ’natural’
(i.e., predicted) bilateral trade ﬂows (see the Appendix for details). This captures the idea
that countries with stronger trade relations are also stronger competitors in tax space.
We use predicted rather than actual trade weights to avoid endogeneity of trade ﬂows
to proﬁt taxation. Alternatively, we base weights on inverse distance. The latter is most
frequently used in empirical models of tax competition and captures the idea that adjacent
countries are stronger competitors than others. However, unlike ’natural’ trade weights,
inverse-distance-based weights ignore country size as a crucial factor in the equation (small
countries with low tax rates may be less serious competitors than large countries with low
tax rates). And, as a third variant, we use ’natural’ stocks of foreign direct investment.
There, the notion is that countries with a strong dependence in foreign direct investments
are stronger competitors than others.
15Let us refer to the slope parameters of the reaction function (with two
instruments, we should refer to this as a surface) of τt with respect to τ∗
t as
βτ and to the one of δt with respect to δ
∗
t as βδ. Furthermore, let us denote
the slope parameter of the reaction function of τt with respect to δ
∗
t as γτ
and the one of the reaction function of δt with respect to τ∗
t as γδ. Then the
econometric model capturing proﬁt tax competition in both τt and δt may
be written as
τt = βτWτt + γτWδt + Xtξτ + uτ,t (13)
δt = βδWδt + γδWτ t + Xtξδ + uδ,t. (14)
Our theoretical model predicts the signs of the coeﬃcients. According to
Hypothesis 1, domestic and foreign statutory tax rates are strategic comple-
ments so that βτ > 0. Similarly, domestic and foreign depreciation allowances
should be strategic complements by Hypothesis 3 so that βδ > 0. Moreover,
Hypothesis 2 states that the domestic statutory tax rate is a strategic substi-
tute to the foreign depreciation allowance, and that the domestic depreciation
allowance is a strategic substitute to the foreign tax rate so that γτ < 0 and
γδ < 0. For the parameters of the country size variable, we expect ξ1,τ > 0
and ξ1,δ > 0 by Hypothesis 6. Regarding the parameters of the cost variable
we expect ξ2,τ < 0 and ξ2,δ < 0, respectively by Hypothesis 7. Finally, for
the parameters of the trade cost variable, we expect ξ3,τ > 0 and ξ3,δ < 0,
according to Hypothesis 4.
5.3 Data and Methodology
We examine these hypotheses using an unbalanced panel data-set of 43
European and also non-European economies which covers the period 1982-
2005.10 The mean statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation allowances
10Note that we treat this data-set as a complete panel even though some of the countries
(namely the Central and Eastern European ones) are not included before the fall of the
iron curtain. From the perspective of tax competition, the rising cross-section over time
entails a very speciﬁc kind of unbalancedness. Speciﬁcally, the opening of the borders to
both goods transaction as well as capital ﬂows was equivalent to an increase in the ’size
16across all countries and years amount to almost 35 percent and nearly 44 per-
cent, respectively. The corresponding standard deviation for either variable
is around 10 percentage points.
Country size is approximated by the logarithm of a country’s real GDP
(using the year 2000 as the base year) and cost by the logarithm of GDP per
capita. GDP and GDP per capita are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators 2008. Finally, we approximate a country’s trade cost
by a trade barrier index which is annually published by the World Economic
Forum.11 Descriptive statistics for all these variables are provided in Table
A1 of the Appendix.
Cross-sectional interdependence through the inclusion of Wτt and Wδt
in (13) and (14) renders the least squares dummy variable estimator of the
parameters (i.e., OLS with ﬁxed country eﬀects) inconsistent. This can be
avoided by instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) with in-
struments WXt, W2Xt, W3Xt, etc. (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). If the
instruments are relevant and uncorrelated with the disturbances, IV-2SLS
will be consistent. In estimation, one should allow the disturbances to be het-
eroskedastic and cross-sectionally and/or serially correlated uτ,t or uδ,t. This
can be accomplished by correcting the estimate of the variance-covariance
matrix. We do so by employing a version of the variance-covariance matrix
estimator for spatially and/or serially correlated data following Driscoll and
Kraay (1998). As our data-set covers 24 consecutive periods, this estimator
yields, under the adopted assumptions, consistent parameter estimates for
the covariates and fairly good estimates also of the ﬁxed eﬀects and, hence,
the disturbances uτ,t and uδ,t.12 See the Appendix for further information
of the world’ in terms of the number of politically independent and at least partially
integrated economies and hence of the number of relevant competitors for FDI.
11For instance, this index has been employed as a measure of trade cost in Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002). We are grateful to
Keith Maskus for providing the data.
12With a very small number of periods but a large number of countries N, it would not
be possible to obtain valid estimates of these residuals due to the relatively large number
of ﬁxed country eﬀects.
17about the estimator used.
5.4 Results
Before turning to regression analysis, let us consider simple correlations
between domestic and foreign tax instruments for the average country and
year in the sample. We do so in Table 1 by using ’natural’ bilateral trade
ﬂows as weights for foreign tax instruments; see the Appendix for a deﬁn-
ition of these weights. We consider simultaneous correlations at time t but
also correlations between domestic tax instruments at t and foreign tax in-
struments in periods t − 2, t − 3, and t − 5. The results are summarized in
Table 1.
−− Table 1 −−
Of course, the corresponding correlation coeﬃcients may be biased for
two reasons: ﬁrst, domestic and foreign tax instruments are endogenous to
each other, at least contemporaneously (see the previous subsection); and,
second, omitting market size, production costs, trade costs, and a number
of time-invariant variables precludes an interpretation of these correlation
coeﬃcients as slopes of the reaction function.
However, the numbers in Table 1 suggest that the cross-sectional variation
in the data is relatively important. This can be seen from the fact that the
correlation coeﬃcients between domestic tax instruments in t and weighted
foreign tax instruments for up to a ﬁve-year lag are very similar. This calls
for the use of ﬁxed eﬀects in the econometric models. However, the correl-
ation coeﬃcients between contemporaneous domestic and weighted foreign
instruments are highest, suggesting that this should be the most important
relationship to look at in the regression analysis.
In what follows, we summarize IV-2SLS parameter estimates in the bench-
mark models for statutory tax rates and depreciation allowances. With each
of the models, we report two sets of standard errors: ones that are based
on the Huber-White sandwich estimator of the variance-covariance matrix
18(ignoring any spatial or serial correlation) and ones that are based on the
SHAC estimator (considering serial correlation of the disturbances with their
counterparts in up to three periods in the past). Tables 2 and 3 summarize
the corresponding estimates for ’natural’ bilateral trade and inverse bilateral
distance as the weights for foreign tax instruments, respectively.
−− Tables 2-3 −−
Let us brieﬂy describe the general model characteristics before turning
to the parameter estimates. First of all, the explanatory power of both the
ﬁrst and the second stage models is generally high (in the table we only re-
port partial R2s for the ﬁrst-stage models, but the R2s in the second stage
are even higher). As expected, country-speciﬁc characteristics are important
and abandoning the country dummies likely would lead to biased parameter
estimates for the covariates. Indeed, it turns out that treating third-country
tax variables as exogenous would be harmful, given the chosen speciﬁcation.
This points to strategic interaction in tax parameters among governments as
hypothesized. Moreover, the incremental explanatory power of the identifying
instruments for the third-country averages of the tax variables is relatively
high.13 The latter renders the insigniﬁcant over-identiﬁcation tests meaning-
ful. Overall, we may conclude that the IV-2SLS models work well.
Regarding the covariates determining the Nash equilibrium in tax para-
meters, we ﬁnd that larger countries tend to set signiﬁcantly higher statutory
tax rates and signiﬁcantly higher depreciation allowances. Higher production
costs are associated with signiﬁcantly lower statutory rates and signiﬁcantly
lower depreciation allowances. Higher trade costs lead to signiﬁcantly higher
statutory tax rates but insigniﬁcantly lower depreciation allowances. Of the
six point estimates for the covariates (i.e., the determinants of the Nash tax
rates), none contradicts the theoretical hypotheses. This holds true for both
Tables 2 and 3.
The parameters determining the slope of the reaction function in the two
dimensions are highly signiﬁcant throughout. In particular, they indicate that
13In matrix notation, we use WX, W2X, and W3X as instruments.
19domestic and foreign statutory tax rates are strategic complements, while
domestic statutory tax rates and foreign depreciation allowances are strategic
substitutes. Furthermore, domestic and foreign depreciation allowances are
strategic complements while domestic depreciation allowances and foreign
statutory tax rates are strategic substitutes. Hence, all the slope parameters
of the reaction function are consistent with our theoretical model, irrespective
of whether we consider ’natural’ trade weights or inverse distance weights to
aggregate foreign countries’ proﬁt tax instruments.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We assess the sensitivity of our ﬁndings in qualitative terms along three gen-
eral lines: measurement of some of the right-hand-side variables (especially
country size, production costs, and trade costs), the aggregation concept for
construction of foreign tax instruments (i.e., the spatial weighting scheme),
and the possibly diﬀerent behavior and slopes of reaction functions of coun-
tries applying tax exemption versus non-exemption on foreign-earned proﬁts.
In the benchmark models summarized in Table 2, we used log real GDP as
a measure of country size. In the theoretical model, we referred to country size
as the number of households/workers in the economy. While log GDP might
generally be a better measure for aggregate demand, log population size
would be closer to our model. However, replacing log GDP by log population
size has little inﬂuence on the reaction function parameters. This becomes
obvious from the set of parameters in the upper block of results reported in
Table 4.
−− Table 4 −−
Furthermore, we used GDP per capita as a measure of production costs
in the benchmark models. Again there are pros and cons for this choice. The
fact that expenditures to cover ﬁxed costs will be accounted for in GDP is
among the latter. An alternative measure of production costs would be labor
compensation (available from the World Development Indicators 2005). Yet,
20replacing log GDP per capita by labor compensation renders the results
qualitatively unaﬀected, again (see the second block of results in Table 4).
The trade cost index in the benchmark models relies on a survey among
managers and CEOs. Managers might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to distinguish between
sheer trade frictions and obstacles to market transactions as such. Accord-
ingly, the index might reﬂect other barriers than just trade barriers. We
address this concern by using the average cost-insurance-freight to free-on-
board bilateral trade values by country (across all importers) and year in
logs. Again, the signs of the reaction function parameters are unaﬀected by
this choice (see the third block of results in Table 4).
Concerning the weights to aggregate foreign countries’ tax parameters,
the results might be sensitive to the use of natural-trade-based weights or
inverse distance-based weights. We suggest sensitivity checks along two gen-
eral lines to infer this issue, namely using alternative weighting concepts
such as contiguity weighting (direct neighbors matter with the same weight
for tax competition while non-neighbors do not matter at all) and foreign
direct investment weighting (tax competition is hypothesized to be tougher
among natural foreign direct investment partners). The Appendix provides
more detail on the construction of these alternative weighting schemes. The
two blocks at the bottom of Table 4 indicate that common borders or higher
natural levels of bilateral foreign direct investment are related to tax com-
petition in a similar fashion as natural trade ﬂows or inverse geographical
distances. In qualitative terms, the results for the signs of the slope paramet-
ers of the reaction function are unaﬀected by these alternative choices of the
weighting scheme.
Finally, one might conjecture that countries applying a tax exemption
scheme to double taxation relief of foreign-earned proﬁts would behave in
the way described here while countries applying a tax credit system (such as
the United States) or a tax deduction system would not. There are various
ways of assessing this issue. We chose to deﬁne an indicator variable which
is unity for non-exemption countries and zero else. Deﬁne the corresponding
21indicator variable vector for period t as nt. Then, we included Wτt and Wδt
along with the interactive terms Wτ t ◦ nt and Wδt ◦ nt, where ◦ indicates
element-wise products. We found insigniﬁcant point estimates on the latter
two variables and signiﬁcant and quantitatively unaltered ones on the former
two variables. Moreover, the ﬁndings suggested that the reaction function is
insigniﬁcantly ﬂatter for non-exemption countries than for exempting ones.
Hence, we do not ﬁnd a starkly diﬀerent behavior between exempting and
non-exempting countries in their competition for the mobile proﬁt tax base.
6 Regional Integration and Tax Policy
In this section we seek to examine the role that regional integration may
have played in fostering tax competition and changing tax rates and de-
preciation allowances in our sample of countries. We do so by comparing
the policy changes predicted by our model over the period 1985—2000 with
counterfactual scenarios, in which the countries did not become members of
regional integration agreements, such as the EU, the European Free Trade
Agreement (EFTA), the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).14
In Table 2 we used ’natural’ trade weights to aggregate foreign tax para-
meters. Notice that regional trade agreements aﬀect the elements of W, ac-
cording to Table A2 in the last subsection of the Appendix. According to
that table, trade ﬂows between any pair of countries in a regional trade
agreement are about 72 percent larger than otherwise — certainly a long-run
eﬀect of trade regionalism, since it is based on a cross-sectional sample in
Table A2. Second, regional trade agreements aﬀect the trade cost index as
a Nash equilibrium shifting variable used in Tables 2-4. It turns out that,
on average, participation of a country in a regional trade agreement in the
14In this section, we aim at studying the consequences of discrete and fairly drastic
changes in regional integration on tax policy. Our propositions and the corresponding
hypotheses are derived locally and thus only valid in the neighborhood of certain para-
meter conﬁgurations. However, simulations suggest that our ﬁndings also hold for discrete
changes in the parameters.
22model reduces the trade cost index by −3.400 units. The latter is obtained
from a regression of the index on free-trade-area membership in a panel of all
country-pairs of the 43 economies and years 1982-2000. The corresponding
direct eﬀect of regional integration on tax parameters is then −3.400 times
the corresponding coeﬃcients in Table 2. However, this eﬀect is modiﬁed
through tax competition and becomes heterogeneous depending on the row
characteristics of normalized ’natural’ trade weights W, as will become clear
below.
Let us refer to the (complete or partial) absence of membership in a re-
gional trade agreement in Europe or North America as an unobserved coun-
terfactual in later years of the panel. Let us use superscript c to denote
counterfactual values of the explanatory variables, Xc
t, or the weighting mat-
rix, Wc. Then, the typical elements of Xc
tξτ and Xc
tξδ due to less integration
in trade are always higher than their counterparts in Xtξτ and Xtξδ as used
in (13) and (14), respectively. The elements upon which Wc is based are
lower than or equal to their counterparts used in W (before normalization).
Obviously, the nonlinearity of (13) and (14) does not permit a trivial infer-
ence of the consequences of such changes on predicted Nash tax rates. The
ultimate impact will be determined by
∆τt ≡ ￿ τ t − ￿ τ
c
t,∆δt ≡ ￿ δt − ￿ δ
c
t, (15)
where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator, ’∧’ denotes estimates, and where
￿ τ t = (I − ˆ βτW − ˆ γτW[I − ˆ βδW]
−1W)
−1Xt, (16)





t = (I − ˆ βτW
c − ˆ γτW









t = (I − ˆ βδW
c − ˆ γδW







−− Table 5 −−
We summarize the consequences of two counterfactual scenarios in Table
5. There we report the average actual change in tax parameters over the
23sample period at the top, the predicted change according to our model (which
is somewhat smaller than the actual change),15 and the following two coun-
terfactual changes: one where we ignore any integration through regional
free-trade trade agreements (FTAs) after 1981,16 and one where we ignore
any regional FTAs before or after 1981.17 In the table, we focus on changes
between 1982 and 2000. Since only 18 countries are covered in 1982, all
changes refer to averages for those economies. According to the results in
the table, the model predicts a smaller reduction in tax rates and a some-
what higher increase in depreciation allowances in the no/less integration
counterfactual scenarios than in the benchmark equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, the
predicted average change in corporate tax rates is more than 15% higher
than the average change in the counterfactual scenario without any FTA
integration. This is consistent with the view that regional trade integration
contributes signiﬁcantly to tougher tax competition. As for the change in de-
preciation allowances we ﬁnd that in the benchmark scenario the rise in the
average depreciation allowance is 26% smaller on average than in the coun-
terfactual scenario without any FTAs. Our theoretical model suggests that
integration, ceteris paribus, should have accelerated the rise in depreciation
allowances. However, since in the data we cannot isolate the eﬀects of changes
in integration from the impact of changes in other fundamental drivers of the
tax base, this ﬁnding does not contradict the theoretical hypotheses.
Due to the nonlinear model structure, it is impossible to orthogonally
decompose the role of the changing reaction function (through the diﬀerence
between W and Wc) versus the changing Nash shifters (through the diﬀer-
ence between Xt and Xc
t). However, we may obtain tentative insights into
their relative importance for the outcome by calculating predicted changes
when using Wc together with Xt in (18) and (19), and, alternatively, when
15Notice that the econometric model is estimated in levels and, hence, performs some-
what better in predicting average tax parameter levels than changes in tax parameters.
16Important changes in economic integration in our sample after 1981 were the enlarge-
ments of the EU (in 1986, 1995, and 2004), the corresponding changes in EFTA, as well
as CUSTA and NAFTA.
17In the latter scenario there is hence no EU, no EFTA, no CUSTA and no NAFTA.
24using W together with Xc
t rather than using Wc with Xc
t. According to the
results in Table 5, the change in equilibrium corporate tax rates between 1982
and 2000 would have been even larger in the absence of a change in Wc.18
Hence, the adjustment of the (slope of the) reaction function oﬀsets part
of the competitive pressure on tax rates through regional integration. All of
those eﬀects are somewhat stronger when abolishing all free trade agreements
in the counterfactual scenario rather than only the ones concluded after 1981.
While Table 5 focused on the ﬁrst moment of changes in tax parameters
due to economic integration in Europe and North America, we may also con-
sider the consequences of economic integration for the (normalized) second
moment, asking whether economic integration fostered a divergence or a con-
vergence of tax parameters. According to our theoretical model, regional in-
tegration — by exerting competitive pressure on individual countries’ proﬁt
tax policy — should lead to a convergence of tax rates across countries and
a divergence of depreciation allowances. To shed light on that matter, we
summarize in Table 6 changes in the coeﬃcient of variation of the policy
scenarios of Table 5.
−− Table 6 −−
According to the results at the top of Table 6, the model prediction about
the change in tax parameters between 1982 and 2000 for the 18 considered
economies is one of convergence. Quite clearly, the results suggest that abol-
ishing regional integration completely or keeping it at its 1981 level leads to
a divergence of the predicted tax parameters. Hence, from that exercise one
could conclude that if harmonization of proﬁt tax policy is on the political
agenda, integration of trade itself has contributed to such a harmonization
through the trade regionalism in the developed part of the world over the
last couple of decades.
18Notice that the change from W to Wc implies a diﬀerent weighting of foreign countries’
tax rates for both an individual as well as the average economy.
257 Conclusions
This paper examined international tax competition in two tax instruments:
a proﬁt tax rate and a depreciation allowance that determines the tax base.
In our theoretical model, we explored the reaction functions in these two
dimensions and investigated how the equilibrium is aﬀected by marginal,
alternative changes in three fundamentals: country size, production costs,
and trade costs. This yielded testable hypotheses concerning the slope of
policy reaction functions and changes in equilibrium policies.
In the empirical part of the paper, we tested these hypotheses with a panel
data-set of 43 countries over the period 1982—2005 and found that the regres-
sion coeﬃcients characterizing both the slopes of the reaction function and
fundamental shifters of equilibrium tax rates were generally signiﬁcant and
had the predicted sign. In particular, we showed that the domestic statutory
tax rate is a strategic complement to foreign statutory tax rates and a stra-
tegic substitute to foreign depreciation allowances. The domestic depreciation
allowance was shown to be a strategic substitute to foreign statutory tax rates
and a strategic complement to foreign depreciation allowances. Moreover, we
found tax rates to be increasing and depreciation allowances to be decreas-
ing in intra-regional trade costs. Country size had a positive and production
costs a negative eﬀect on both tax rates and depreciation allowances.
We then used the empirical model to simulate the eﬀects of regional integ-
ration on tax rates and depreciation allowances. In particular, we computed
counterfactual scenarios, in which the countries in our sample did not par-
ticipate in regional integration agreements, such as the EU or NAFTA. We
compared predicted equilibrium tax rates based on ’natural’ trade weights
cum regional trade agreements with ones based on counterfactual ’natural’
trade weights in the absence of such agreements. The picture that emerged
was that changes in corporate tax systems are by and large consistent with
regional integration. Regarding the corporate tax rates we found that the
predicted average change in corporate tax rates was more than 15% higher
than the average change in the counterfactual scenario without any regional
26trade integration. This is consistent with the view that regional trade integ-
ration has contributed signiﬁcantly to tougher tax competition and to a fall
in corporate tax rates.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs
8.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We derive the EMTR for H; the derivation of F’s EMTR is equivalent. The
after-tax proﬁt generated by a ﬁrm located in H and selling its output in




, and QF =
(1 − αc − s)
2
,
which implies a maximized after-tax proﬁt equal to:
ˆ ΠH = (1 − τ)
n(1 − αc)




The tax revenue accruing to H from such a ﬁrm is equal to:
τ
n(1 − αc)




(1 − α)c(n(1 − αc) + (1 − αc − s))
2
, (21)
where the second term adjusts for the fact that for α  = 1 there is an implicit
subsidy/tax on the ﬁrm’s output.
Now it is straightforward to compute the social welfare country H derives
from the presence of domestic and multinational ﬁrms. In the case of domestic
ﬁrms, the proﬁt tax is simply redistributed to the local owners and thus does
not aﬀect welfare. The welfare associated with a good produced by a domestic
ﬁrm is hence independent of τ and thus equal to the sum of consumer surplus












(1 − α)c(n(1 − αc) + (1 − αc − s))
2
.
27In the case of a good produced by a multinational, social welfare equals











(1 − α)c(n(1 − αc) + (1 − αc − s))
2
.
In setting τ the government has to take into account the multinational’s
participation constraint (8). Since this constraint has to be binding at the
optimum, we can use it to eliminate τ in the welfare function. This yields as
social welfare:
WH(α) − (1 − τ
∗)
(1 − α∗c)




Hence the optimal α, denoted by ¯ α, is the same for domestic and multina-
tional ﬁrms. Maximization of WH(α) with respect to α gives:
¯ α =
(2c − n + 2cn)
(n + 2)c
. (23)
8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
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288.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
At s = 0 we obtain
∂(¯ τ − ¯ τ∗)
∂s
=
(58n + 39n2 + 6n3 + 2n4 + 30)(n − 1)
2(1 − c)(n + 1)
2 (n + 2)
2 (2n + 1)
> 0,
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8.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
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8.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
For s = 0 and n suﬃciently big, we obtain ∂¯ τ
∂c = 0, ∂¯ τ∗
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29for s can c small enough, where



















The data used in the present analysis fall into three categories: ones on
statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation allowances (the dependent
variables of our empirical analysis); explanatory variables which are supposed
to measure country size (n), production costs (c), and trade costs (s) in the
theoretical analysis; and variables which measure the relative independence
of tax parameters across countries as a function not only of unilateral n,
c, and s, but also of bilateral integration among the economies — we will
use ’natural’ bilateral trade ﬂows and, in the sensitivity analysis, stocks of
bilateral foreign direct investment as measures thereof. Let us summarize in
this subsection of the appendix which variables we use and which sources
they come from.
Information on tax codes are primarily taken from the following online
sources of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD): Asia-
Paciﬁc - Taxation & Investment; Central/Eastern Europe - Taxation & In-
vestment; Corporate Taxation in Europe; Global Tax Surveys; and Tax News
Service.
Additionally, the information on tax law from a number of printed pub-
lications has been used:
• Arthur Anderson, 1992-1996. A tax guide to Europe, London: Arthur
Andersen
• Baker&McKenzie, 1999. Survey of the eﬀective tax burden in the
European Union, Amsterdam.
30• Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Report of the com-
mittee of independent experts on company taxation, Brussels and Lux-
embourg.
• Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an internal
market without tax obstacles. A strategy for providing companies with
a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM
(2001) 582 ﬁnal, Brussels.
• Coopers & Lybrand, 1991-1998. International tax summaries : a guide
for planning and decisions, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
• Ernst&Young, 2003. Company taxation in the new EU Member states
survey of the tax regimes and eﬀective tax burdens for multinational
investors, Frankfurt am Main.
• Ernst&Young, 1998-2003. Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, Frankfurt
am Main.
• IBFD, 1994-1999. Central and East European Tax Directory, Amster-
dam.
• IBFD, 1990-2005. European Tax Handbook, Amsterdam.
• IBFD, 1990-2001. Steuerberaterhandbuch Europa, Bonn: Stollfuss.
• IBFD, 1990-1994. Taxation in European Socialist Countries, Amster-
dam.
• Matthew Bender, 1990-2003. Foreign tax and trade briefs : interna-
tional withholding tax treaty guide, New York: LexisNexis.
• Nexia International, 1992-2003. The international Handbook of Corpor-
ate and Personal Taxation, London: LexisNexis.
• OECD, 1991. Taxing Proﬁts in a Global Economy: Domestic and In-
ternational Issues, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
31• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999. Spectre: Study of potential of eﬀective
corporate tax rates in Europe, Report commissioned by the Ministry of
Finance in the Netherlands, Amsterdam.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1990-2004. Corporate taxes: worldwide sum-
maries, Hoboken: Wiley.
• Yoo, K.-Y., 2003. Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment in-
come 1991-2001, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No.
365, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
These sources provide information about the number of years for which
depreciations can be claimed (i.e., the ’depreciation rate’), the depreciation
system (i.e., whether there depreciation follows a straight line or a declin-
ing balance schedule), and on (general) investment incentives (e.g., on the
existence of extra ﬁrst-year allowances in Australia, Poland, or Spain). Oth-
erwise, the computation of the net present value of depreciation allowances
follows King and Fullerton (1984) and Devereux and Griﬃth (1998). In line
with those authors, we use the most generous option of depreciation in case
that the model ﬁrm has several opportunities to choose from. The data used
here are a (balanced) subset of the ones in Egger, Loretz, Pfaﬀermayr, and
Winner (2009).
Measures of Nash-equilibrium-shifting variables n, c, and s:
In Tables 2-4, we associate country size (n) mainly with log real GDP,
production costs (c) mainly with log GDP-per-capita, and trade costs (s)
mainly with a trade cost index. For instance, this is the case throughout
Tables 2-3. The source of the data on real GDP and GDP per capita is the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2008. The trade cost index is
published by the World Economic Forum and has kindly been provided by
Keith Maskus.
In the sensitivity analysis (Table 4), we use log population instead of
log real GDP as an alternative measure for n, log manufacturing wages per
worker instead of log GDP per capita to measure production costs c, and log
32unilateral cost-insurance-freight/free-on-board (c.i.f./f.o.b.) ratios of goods
trade ﬂows as a measure of trade costs (s). These variables are taken from
the following sources. Population is based on ﬁgures in the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. Average wages per worker in manufacturing
stem from United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s Industrial
Statistics Database. To calculate unilateral c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios, we use bilateral
aggregate goods trade data from the United Nations’ World Trade Database.
More speciﬁcally, we take all countries’ imports from a given economy and
divide them by this country’s exports into all economies in our sample in a
given year. Theoretically, this ratio should be larger than unity and the de-
viation from unity should measure unilateral trade costs in a given year with
the covered countries. It is well known that c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios are not a perfect
measure of trade costs, since they are prone to measurement error. However,
Limão and Venables (2001) illustrated that they are at least systematically
correlated with (for most countries unobserved) true trade costs.
Measures of the strength of interdependence between domestic
and foreign tax rates:
In Tables 2-4, we pursue a variety of approaches to weight foreign coun-
tries’ tax parameters, i.e., to parameterize the channel and the decay of tax
competition in some metric. Since economic integration is a key factor de-
termining tax competition in our theoretical analysis, our benchmark results
in Table 2 are based upon ’natural’ goods-trade-weighted tax parameters.
For this, we take bilateral exports among all countries in our sample for the
years 1982-2000 from United Nations’ World Trade Database. How we then
proceed to obtain ’natural’ bilateral (export plus import) trade weights is
described in the last subsection of this Appendix.
Alternatively, we use inverse bilateral distances between all countries (in
Table 3), contiguity-based weights (in Table 4) and ’natural’ bilateral stock-
of-foreign-direct-investment-based weights (in Table 4). Bilateral distance
and a bilateral contiguity indicator is taken from the Geographical Database
published by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Interna-
33tionales (CEPII). Bilateral stocks of outward FDI are taken from the FDI
online database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). As for ’natural’ bilateral trade weights, the last subsection of
this Appendix describes how we obtain ’natural’ bilateral (outward plus in-
ward) FDI stock weights.
8.3 Descriptive statistics
Table A1 summarizes the averages and standard deviations for the key vari-
ables in our analysis: statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation allow-
ances as the two endogenous variables and measures of market size (GDP),
production costs (GDP/capita), and trade costs.
−− Table A1 −−
Summary statistics on other variables used in the sensitivity analysis in
Table 4 are available from the authors upon request.
8.4 IV-2SLS GMM estimator
For the deﬁnition of the IV-2SLS GMM estimator and its heteroskedasticity
and spatial as well as serial autocorrelation-consistent (SHAC) estimator of
the variance-covariance matrix in the spirit of Driscoll and Kraay (1998),
it will be useful to introduce some further notation. Recall that we indicate
countries by i = 1,...,N and time periods by t = 1,...,T. For convenience, let
us use the running index ℓ = τ,δ to refer to the two equations (13) and (14),
respectively. Furthermore, deﬁne the N×(K+2) matrix Zt = [Wτt,Wδt,Xt]
and referto the NT×(K+2) stacked version of this matrix (covering all years)
as Z. IV-2SLS potentially involves sets of instruments which diﬀer across
equations. Deﬁne the number of instruments in equation ℓ as Pℓ ≥ K+2 and
collect the instruments for equation ℓ and all years into the NT ×Pℓ matrix
Dℓ.19 Then, we may deﬁne the projection ˆ Zℓ = Dℓ(D′
ℓDℓ)−1D′
ℓZℓ. Later on,
19Of course, the NY × K matrix X of exogenous variables in (13) and (14) is part of
Dℓ.
34we will refer to one row of ˆ Zℓ by the 1 × (K + 2) vector ˆ zℓit. Finally, collect
the IV-2SLS parameters for equation ℓ into the (K +2)×1 vector θℓ. Let us
refer to the (ineﬃcient) estimate of the (K+2)×(K+2) variance-covariance
matrix of the parameters as ˆ Vℓ = (Z′
ℓDℓD′
ℓZℓ)−1.
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) suggest averaging the moment conditions to
obtain ht(θℓ) = 1
N
￿N
i=1 hit(θℓ). Let us use the notation hℓt = ht(θℓ) and





























A HAC estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with IV-2SLS in the
spirit of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) is then deﬁned as







Driscoll and Kraay (1998) prove that such a Newey and West (1987)-type
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix relies on fairly weak assumptions.
8.5 “Natural” trade and foreign direct investment
based weights matrices in the empirical model
In Table 2 we use ’natural’ trade and in Table 4 ’natural’ foreign direct
investment as weights to compute competitor countries’ statutory tax rates
and depreciation allowances. They are derived from cross-sectional empirical
models using average bilateral exports and stocks of outward foreign direct
investment, respectively, as the dependent variable for the period 1982-2000
for all pairings among the 43 countries in our analysis. Apart from exporter
(parent country) and importer (host country) ﬁxed eﬀects, the empirical
35models include the following explanatory variables of exports or outward
foreign direct investment: log bilateral distance, common border between
exporter and importer, and a free trade area indicator (as reported to the
World Trade Organization).
Since both trade ﬂows and stocks of foreign direct investment take zero
values, we follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate the equa-
tions by a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood routine. In Table A2, we sum-
marize the coeﬃcient estimates for the model determining ’natural’ bilateral
trade ﬂows which are used to weight foreign statutory corporate tax rates
and depreciation allowances for each year in Table 2. The associated model
predictions are then used to compute predicted (’natural’) exports plus im-
ports and outward plus inward stocks of FDI, respectively, for each country
pair. This results in two matrices whose elements are divided by the corres-
ponding row sums and diagonal elements are set to zero to obtain a matrix
W which is used to weight a country’s competitors’ tax parameters.
−− Table A2 −−
The estimation results for bilateral FDI stocks which are used as an al-
ternative weighting scheme in the sensitivity analysis at the bottom of Table
4 are available form the authors upon request.
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